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The EU ETS has been criticised for threatening the competitiveness of European industry and 
generating carbon leakage, i.e. increasing foreign greenhouse gas emissions. Two main options have 
been put forward to tackle these concerns: border adjustments and output-based allocation, i.e. 
allocation of free allowances in proportion to current production. We compare various configurations of 
these two options, as well as a scenario with full auctioning and no border adjustment. Against this 
background, we develop a model of the main sectors covered by the EU ETS: electricity, steel, cement 
and aluminium. We conclude that the most efficient way to tackle leakage is auctioning with border 
adjustment, which generally induces a negative leakage (a spillover). Another relatively efficient policy 
is to combine auctioning in the electricity sector and output-based allocation in exposed industries, 
especially if free allowances are given both for direct and indirect emissions, i.e. those generated by 
the generation of the electricity consumed. Although output-based allocation is generally less effective 
than border adjustment to tackle leakage, it is more effective to mitigate production losses in the 
sectors affected by the ETS. 
 







Limiter les fuites dans le système européen d’échange de quotas d’émission de gaz à effet de 







Le système européen d’échange de quotas d’émission de gaz à effet de serre (GES) a été critiqué 
comme menaçant la compétitivité de l’industrie européenne et comme générant des fuites de carbone, 
c’est-à-dire une augmentation des émissions de GES à l’étranger. Principalement, deux options ont 
été avancées pour traiter ces problèmes : l’ajustement aux frontières et l’allocation basée sur la 
production, c’est-à-dire une allocation gratuite de permis proportionnelle à la production courante. 
Nous développons un modèle représentant les principaux secteurs inclus dans le système européen 
de quotas (électricité, acier, ciment et aluminium) et analysons plusieurs configurations de chacune de 
ces options, ainsi qu’un scénario avec enchères et sans ajustement aux frontières. Nous trouvons 
qu’une allocation par l’intermédiaire d’enchères, complétée par un ajustement aux frontières, permet 
de limiter le plus les fuites de carbone, voire de diminuer les émissions dans les pays hors UE27 
(fuites négatives). Une autre politique relativement efficace est de combiner des enchères pour le 
secteur de l’électricité et une allocation basée sur la production pour les secteurs exposés aux fuites 
de carbone, en particulier si la quantité de permis distribuée tient compte des émissions directes et 
indirectes (liées à la génération de l’électricité consommée). Bien que cette dernière option soit 
généralement moins efficace qu’un ajustement aux frontières pour limiter les fuites de carbone, elle 
permet néanmoins de réduire les pertes de production dans les secteurs exposés à la concurrence 
internationale. 
 
Mots-clés: système de permis négociables, ajustement aux frontières, allocation basée sur la 
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Addressing leakage in the EU ETS: 
Border adjustment or output-based allocation? 
 
Stéphanie Monjon1 and Philippe Quirion23 
 
Abstract  
The EU ETS has been criticised for threatening the competitiveness of European industry and 
generating carbon leakage, i.e. increasing foreign greenhouse gas emissions. Two main options have 
been put forward to tackle these concerns: border adjustments and output-based allocation, i.e. 
allocation of free allowances in proportion to current production. We compare various 
configurations of these two options, as well as a scenario with full auctioning and no border 
adjustment. Against this background, we develop a model of the main sectors covered by the EU ETS: 
electricity, steel, cement and aluminium. We conclude that the most efficient way to tackle leakage is 
auctioning with border adjustment, which generally induces a negative leakage (a spillover). This 
holds even if the border adjustment does not include indirect emissions, if it is based on EU (rather 
than foreign) specific emissions, or (for some values of the parameters) if it covers only imports. 
Another relatively efficient policy is to combine auctioning in the electricity sector and output-based 
allocation in exposed industries, especially if free allowances are given both for direct and indirect 
emissions, i.e. those generated by the generation of the electricity consumed. Although output-
based allocation is generally less effective than border adjustment to tackle leakage, it is more 
effective to mitigate production losses in the sectors affected by the ETS. 
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1. Introduction 
After the results of the last UNFCCC conference in Copenhagen and since the US is unlikely to 
implement a cap-and-trade system in the next years, industry groups in the EU will certainly continue 
to argue the threat imposed by the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) against their 
international competitiveness. The fears of competitiveness losses and of carbon leakage are the 
main arguments put forward by industry lobby groups against stringent climate policies, and in 
favour of free allocation of allowances.4 Competitiveness and leakage are also the motivations of 
border adjustments proposals. 
Directive 2009/29/EC, which revises the EU ETS, will be applied from the third period of the ETS, i.e. 
from 2013 onwards. Changes include a much higher share of auctioning, especially in the electricity 
sector, and some provisions for limiting carbon leakage. The main one is the continued free 
allowance allocation to the “sectors or subsectors which are exposed to a significant risk of carbon 
leakage” (Article 10a-12). However, the Directive also states that “[b]y 30 June 2010, the Commission 
shall *…+ submit to the European Parliament and to the Council *…+ any appropriate proposals, which 
may include *…+ inclusion in the Community scheme of importers of products which are produced by 
the sectors or subsectors [exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage+ ”. In other words, the 
Directive mentions, albeit cautiously, a border adjustment (BA) for GHG–intensive imports.. 
In the US, the Waxman-Markey bill, which was adopted by the House of Representatives in 2009, 
includes more concrete provisions. If no international agreement on climate change has been 
reached by January 1, 2018, the president of the United States is required to set up an “international 
reserve allowance program.” From 2020 onwards, imports in a covered sector would be prohibited 
unless the importer has obtained an “appropriate” amount of emission allowances from the 
international reserve allowance program.5 
Hence, the political debate on the competitiveness impact of the ETS, the related carbon leakage and 
on the most appropriate policies for reducing this impact (if any) is not over. The debate is also still 
open from an academic point of view: there is disagreement among researchers both on the 
quantitative importance of leakage and on the effectiveness of the policy instruments proposed to 
limit leakage and competitiveness impacts (Droege et al., 2009). 
Referring to this debate, the objective of this paper is to compare the performances of both 
alternatives – free allocation and border adjustment – to limit carbon leakage, as well as to mitigate 
production loss, following the increased ambition of the EU ETS during the third period. We develop 
a computational framework allowing to represent the European industry at a disaggregated level 
(cement, aluminium, steel and electricity) and to analyse the design of the different "anti-leakage" 
options. Then, we provide a quantitative assessment of the impact of these "anti-leakage" policies on 
the activity of the different industries included in the model, compared to a scenario without a 
climate policy, and to a scenario featuring auctioned allowances without any specific "anti-leakage" 
feature.  
The results show that the determination of the “best option” depends on the target, i.e. limitation of 
carbon leakage or mitigation of European production loss, and differs depending on the sector 
                                               
4
 In this context, carbon leakage is defined as the increase in GHG emissions in non-European countries caused by the 
implementation of the EU ETS. See Droege et al. (2009) for a deeper discussion about the definition of carbon leakage. 
5 Similarly, the cap-and-trade bills introduced in the U.S. Senate also include provisions for border adjustments, although 
with less details. This is the case of S. 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act introduced by Senators Kerry 
and Boxer on October 23, 2009 (Larsen et al., 2009) and of S. 2877, the Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal Act 
introduced by Senators Cantwell and Collins on December 11, 2009. The latter proposes an adjustment for both imports, 
through a “border carbon adjustment”, and exports, through a “targeted relief fund for exporters” (Larsen and Bradbury, 
2010). 
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considered as well. This last point emphasises the importance of conducting this kind of analysis 
using a highly disaggregated model. 
This paper is organised as follows: section 2 briefly discusses the previous assessments of carbon 
leakage and of anti-leakage options; section 3 presents the different scenarios simulated, while 
section 4 details the model; finally, section 5 discusses the results; and section 6 will provide 
conclusions. 
 
2. Carbon leakage and anti-leakage options: results of previous studies  
2.1. Carbon leakage: assessments and main channels 
Since the UNFCCC was signed, carbon leakage has become an issue that is regularly discussed and 
evaluated (for an early reference, cf. Felder and Rutherford, 1993; for recent surveys, cf. Gerlagh and 
Kuik, 2007, and Droege et al., 2009). Given the global nature of the GHG emissions, carbon leakage 
can reduce the environmental efficiency of a climate policy if only one group of countries commits to 
abate their emissions while the others do not, as in the Kyoto protocol. The main indicator of leakage 
is the ratio between the increase in GHG emissions in non-Annex I countries and the decrease in GHG 
emissions in Annex I countries. This ratio is called the leakage rate or leakage-to-reduction ratio.6 The 
variations are calculated for a scenario with the climate policy and a scenario without. The estimated 
leakage-to-reduction ratios in applied models vary considerably, from 2% to 130% (Droege et al., 
2009).  
Two main channels of carbon leakage have been identified in the literature (Reinaud, 2008a). A first 
leakage channel, sometimes called “energy-price-driven leakage”, goes through the energy markets. 
That is, climate policies decrease the international prices of oil, gas and coal; hence they increase 
their use in countries without a climate policy. Another channel, often called “the GHG-intensive 
industry” channel, or “competitiveness-driven” route, is related to competitiveness. For instance, the 
EU ETS increases the production cost of European producers in GHG intensive sectors, some of which 
are exposed to international competition. If European producers pass through the cost to consumers, 
then they may lose some market shares vis-à-vis foreign producers. If they do not pass through the 
cost due to international competition, then the European plants with the highest production cost 
may become unprofitable and cease operation. In both cases, European industry will lose some 
market shares in both European and foreign markets, with two main consequences: job losses and an 
increase in GHG emissions in non-European countries, i.e. carbon leakage.  
Two main parameters explain the wide range of leakage-to-reduction ratio estimates. The first is 
linked to energy-price-driven leakage: the ratio decreases with the supply elasticity of fossil fuels 
(Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007). Specifically, with lower supply elasticity, a given decrease in European fossil 
fuel demand generates a higher response of fossil fuels price, hence a higher increase in foreign 
emissions. The second parameter is linked to competitiveness-driven leakage: the ratio increases 
with the substitutability between domestic and imported products: see the sensitivity analysis in 
Bernard and Vielle (2009, Appendix B3). 
Two main options to reduce carbon leakage have been assessed with economic models: border 
adjustments and output-based allocation. As we shall see, with only two exceptions, these options 
                                               
6 Michael Grubb (personal communication) recently rightly pointed out that the expression “leakage rate” is sometimes 
wrongly interpreted as the share of EU emissions (or production) that would “leak” to countries without a climate policy, 
which is completely wrong. Hence we prefer to use the expression “leakage-to-reduction ratio”. 
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have not been assessed in the same framework, preventing a systematic comparison of their 
effectiveness7. 
2.2 Border adjustments 
A BA is a trade measure designed to level the playing field between domestic producers facing costly 
climate policy and foreign producers with no or little constraint on their GHG emissions. Border 
adjustments have been assessed both through partial equilibrium models of a particular industry and 
through general equilibrium models.  
Mathiesen and Maestad (2004) simulate a carbon tax in Annex I, with and without border 
adjustments, in a global partial equilibrium model of the steel industry. They show that border 
adjustments tackle leakage very efficiently: a border adjustment based on average specific emissions 
(i.e. emissions per tonne) in Non-Annex I countries actually reduces steel production and emissions in 
Non-Annex I countries. Consequently the leakage-to-reduction ratio becomes negative, falling from 
40% without the border tax to -31%. Note, however, that setting an export border adjustment at the 
level of Non-Annex I specific emissions, which are higher than Annex I specific emissions, constitutes 
an export subsidy for the average Annex I producer, which seems hardly compatible with the WTO 
(cf. e.g. Ismer and Neuhoff 2007).  
Demailly and Quirion (2008a) also simulate a carbon tax in Annex I, with and without border 
adjustments, but this time in a global partial equilibrium model of the cement industry. Here again, 
BAs efficiently tackle leakage: the leakage-to-reduction ratio falls from 25% without BA to -2% or 4%, 
depending on the level of the border adjustment assumed. In the first case, production exported 
from Annex I is completely exempted from the climate policy and imports of cement from the rest of 
the world are taxed in accordance with the CO2 intensity of cement production in the exporting 
country. In the second case, exports benefit from a rebate corresponding only to the least CO2 
intensive technology available at a large scale (a gas-fired plant with the highest energy efficiency 
available), and imports are taxed at the same level. 
Peterson and Schleich (2007) specifically examine the economic and environmental effects of a 
border adjustment imposed on countries outside Annex I, or which did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
The adjustment is applied to both imports and exports, and to both direct and indirect emissions. The 
authors discuss their capacity to mitigate the loss in export competitiveness, to neutralise the 
increased import competition as well as to limit carbon leakage in the whole Annex I. The 
performances related to the commercial flows differ depending on sectors and countries. For 
instance, “the *border adjustment+ is effective in neutralising the increased import competition for 
most energy-intensive sectors in the EU 15”, while “it has little effect on import competitiveness in 
the rest of European Union (REU)”. This is because the energy-intensive products of the REU are 
more carbon intensive and around 90% of all their imports of energy-intensive products come from 
other Annex I countries on which no BA is imposed. On the other hand, border adjustment has only a 
low impact on leakage. This may be explained by the fact that border adjustments cannot prevent 
leakage from the international energy markets channel. Indeed, in most CGE models, and 
presumably in this one also, the larger part of leakage occurs through the "energy markets channel" 
(Burniaux et al., 2008).  
Kuik and Hofkes (2009) study the effectiveness of border adjustment for tackling the leakage due to 
the EU ETS. Their model comprises the following sectors: mineral products, steel, electricity and 
others. The BA is applied only to imported products and direct emissions. Two variants are examined: 
the adjustment is based either on the direct CO2 emissions per unit of similar product in the EU, or on 
the average direct CO2 emissions per unit of production in the foreign (exporting) country. The BAs 
                                               
7 Admittedly, Meunier and Ponssard (2009) also simulate both options, but applied them in a very different manner: they 
assess a scenario with auctioned allowances in the EU, output-based allocation in China and a border adjustment on 
exports from China towards the EU. 
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succeed in limiting the decrease in domestic output in steel and mineral products but (by design) 
does not mitigate the loss in export competitiveness. The authors find an aggregate leakage-to-
reduction ratio of 11% without a border adjustment, which decreases to 10% if the border 
adjustment is based on the direct CO2 emissions per unit of similar product in the EU and to 8% if it is 
based on the average direct CO2 emissions per unit of production in the foreign (exporting) country. 
The limited impact of the border adjustment is due to two factors. Firstly, as explained above, border 
adjustments obviously cannot tackle “energy-price-driven” leakage. Secondly, the scope of the 
border adjustment studied is limited since it covers neither exports nor indirect emissions. 
Alexeeva-Talebi et al. (2008a) compare, in a CGE model, the implementation of a BA and of what 
they call an “integrated emission trading” (IET) scheme as a complement to the EU ETS. In their BA 
scenario, the carbon content of the imported goods is based on average specific emissions in the EU. 
In contrast, in the IET, foreign producers have to purchase emission allowances for their imports on 
the basis on their own specific emissions. The authors show that BA mitigates domestic production 
losses more effectively, while IET achieves a greater reduction in foreign emissions since it 
encourages abatement abroad. 
Alexeeva-Talebi et al. (2008b) analyse the implications of BAs and of access to the clean development 
mechanism (CDM) within the EU ETS, compared to a scenario with a unilateral implementation of the 
EU ETS in 2020, no BA and no access to the CDM. Employing a CGE model, they show that BAs 
efficiently mitigate the production decline caused by a unilateral European climate policy on energy-
intensive and export-oriented industries, especially if applied both to imports and exports, and if 
based on foreign rather than on EU average emission factors. This decline reaches 1.69% in the EU27 
without a BTA, vs. 1.23% with a BA on imports only, 0.58 with a BTA on exports only and 0.11% with 
a BTA on both, if EU emission factors are used. With foreign emission factors, EU output in the 
sectors covered by the BA actually increases since EU average emission factors are lower than foreign 
ones. 
Manders and Veenendaal (2008) also examine whether a BA mitigates the impacts of climate policy, 
making use of the general equilibrium model WorldScan. They find a rather low leakage-to-reduction 
ratio with a unilateral climate policy: 3.3%. This ratio becomes negative with an import BA (-1.4%), 
with an export BA (-1.3%) and even more with a BA on both imports and exports (-2.8%), even 
though the EU average emission factors are used to calculate the BA. The negative leakage-to-
reduction ratios often induced by BAs in simulations with partial as well as general equilibrium 
models may be surprising; we will explain these results in section 5, while presenting our own 
findings. 
2.3 Output-based allocation 
Output-based allocation applied to climate policies has been assessed in two partial equilibrium 
models and in a few general equilibrium ones.  
Demailly and Quirion (2006) use a modified version of the world partial equilibrium model of the 
cement industry which was used by the same authors (Demailly and Quirion, 2008a) to assess a BA. 
They compare full auctioning to OBA for a unilateral implementation of the EU ETS and show that 
OBA would efficiently tackle leakage: at €20/tCO2, the leakage-to-reduction ratio would fall from 
50%8 to 9%.  
The same authors (Demailly and Quirion, 2008b) develop a simple partial equilibrium model of the 
steel sector and find a leakage-to-reduction ratio in the range of 0.5% to 25%, depending on the 
                                               
8 Their model does not include the possible substitution between clinker and CO2-free substitutes, which, as we shall see in 
section 5, greatly reduces abatement in the sector. This explains the high level of leakage which they find under full 
auctioning. 
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parameters and on the policy options. With an output-based updating of allowance allocation every 
five years, the leakage-to-reduction ratio is roughly halved compared to auctioning. 
Fischer and Fox (2009b), following other works involving the same authors (e.g. Bernard et al., 2007), 
simulate with a general equilibrium a tax at $14/t CO2 in the US applied to the six major energy-
intensive sectors: electricity, petroleum and coal products, iron and steel, chemicals, non-metallic 
minerals, and paper, pulp, and print. They compare a scenario with “production rebates”, equivalent 
to output-based allocation, to a tax without rebates (equivalent to auctioning). Interestingly, the 
rebates have little effect on the leakage-to-reduction ratio, either overall or for the covered sectors 
as a whole. The reason is that while foreign emissions increase less with the rebates, domestic 
sectors also decrease less. However, what the authors call “domestic leakage” of emissions to 
uncovered sectors is substantially reduced. 
2.4 Comparisons of border adjustments and output-based allocation 
Demailly and Quirion (2008b) use a former version of our model to compare BA and OBA. Compared 
to their study, ours is based on an improved model and assess several versions of these anti-leakage 
options, so we will not present their results here.  
The other paper which compares these options in the same framework is Fischer and Fox (2009a) but 
for the US and Canadian context. The authors consider a tax at $20/tCO2. They disentangle the 
carbon leakage between an average leakage which reflects the relative changes in emissions induced 
by the overall carbon price and what they call the marginal leakage, that is the change in the foreign 
sector emissions induced by production changes in that sector (i.e. the “competitiveness-driven” 
leakage mentioned above). In scope, the leakage attributable to shifts in production turns out to be a 
small part of the aggregate leakage: for instance, in the steel sector, the average leakage amounts to 
60%, while the marginal leakage is 14%. The authors find that for most US sectors a full BA is most 
effective at reducing global emissions. In contrast, when the BA is set at the domestic emissions rate 
or lower, a domestic rebate can be more effective at limiting emissions leakage and encouraging 
domestic production. 
2.5 Limits of previous studies 
CGE models encompass a rich set of economic mechanisms but most of them are limited by the 
sectoral resolution of the GTAP database on which they are typically based. Indeed, several 
competitiveness analyses (e.g. Lund, 2007 for the EU; Hourcade et al., 2007 for the UK, Graichen et 
al., 2008 for Germany, de Bruyn et al., 2008 for the Netherlands, and Ho et al., 2008, for the US) have 
shown that within GTAP sectors like “non-metallic minerals” or “non-ferrous metals”, subsectors 
differ widely as regards their exposure to international trade and their GHG-intensity. Assessing 
carbon leakage thus requires focusing on more detailed sectors. 
Sector-specific partial equilibrium models, though not covering the whole range of mechanisms and 
aspects through which carbon leakage could occur, fill a gap left by top-down macroeconomic 
models, because they are more detailed in their data sets and they include sector-specific 
technological patterns or economic geography. However since they model only one sector they 
cannot compare the impact on different sectors or the impacts of inter-sectoral trade in carbon 
allowances. 
Against this background the contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, we develop a 
computational framework which enables examination of all the relevant options in a unified setup: 
we compare the performances of the two alternatives – output-based allocation and border 
adjustment – to limit carbon leakage, as well as to mitigate production loss, due to the unilateral EU 
emission regulation in the EU ETS during the third period (2013-2020). Secondly, the model features 
a higher level of disaggregation than most general equilibrium models. Four sectors are represented: 
cement (with a detailed treatment of clinker production and trade), aluminium, steel and electricity. 
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Lastly, the framework allows precise analysis of the design of the different "anti-leakage" options and 
thus identifying the “key” characteristics of each option in each sector.  
 
3. The scenarios 
Our goal is to evaluate the efficiency of different instruments to mitigate the production loss and to 
limit carbon leakage due to the EU ETS. We consider two possible options: output-based allocation 
(OB) and border adjustment (BA). Each option can be applied in different ways, which, as we shall 
see, impacts its capacity to limit carbon leakage or to alleviate industrial production loss in Europe. 
 
3.1. Output-based allocation (OB) 
Directive 2009/29/EC, which revises the EU ETS for 2013 onwards, includes some provisions to limit 
carbon leakage. The main provision is the continued free allowance allocation to the “sectors or 
subsectors which are exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage” (Article 10a-12). Yet as 
explained in Matthes and Monjon (2008) and Ellerman (2008), since allocation in the EU ETS is linked 
to production capacity, not to actual output, it can reduce the incentive to relocate production 
capacity (investment leakage) but not the incentive to use existing plants abroad rather than EU 
plants (operational leakage). A suggested approach for tackling this problem is output-based 
allocation, in which, for example, a steel producer would receive a given amount of allowances per 
tonne of steel actually produced. Practically, this requires an update of the allocation when 
production is known. Output-based allocation presents both pros and cons, which are discussed in 
Boemare and Quirion (2002) and Quirion (2009). In particular, an OB allocation, called “home rebate” 
by Fischer and Fox (2009a), keeps the playing field at home and abroad but at the expense of 
opportunities to reduce emissions by reducing consumption. Since actual production is partly linked 
to production capacity, the allocation method in the EU ETS can be seen as an intermediate one 
between pure lump-sum allocation and output-based allocation. 
In the present paper, we model output-based allocation since it would more efficiently tackle leakage 
than the capacity-based allocation of the EU ETS. Several configurations of such OB allocation are 
then considered.  
 
3.2. Border adjustment (BA) 
A growing body of literature (cf. section 2.2 above) has come to the conclusion that BAs may 
effectively prevent climate policies from negatively impacting European industry's competitiveness9. 
In the EU, recital 25 of the Directive 2009/29/EC adds:  
“An effective carbon equalisation system could be introduced with a view to putting 
installations from the Community which are at significant risk of carbon leakage and those 
from third countries on a comparable footing. Such a system could apply requirements to 
importers that would be no less favourable than those applicable to installations within the 
Community, for example by requiring the surrender of allowances.” 
Interest is heating up in the US as well10: in the Waxman-Markey bill adopted by the House of 
Representatives a cap-and-trade scheme with a BA is planned for 2016 onwards (James, 2009; van 
Asselt and Brewer, 2010).11 
                                               
9 There is considerable literature which debates the legality of BA for climate policies under WTO rules, which we do not 
refer to in further detail in this paper. See for instance UNEP and WTO (2009) or Kommerskollegium (2009).  
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When a BA is considered, we assume that allowances are auctioned. Indeed, a BA is much more 
difficult to justify under free allocation than under auctioning: with a BA the European industry does 
not suffer from a competitive disadvantage (or much less so), there is thus little rationale for free 
allocation, which creates economic distortions (Matthes and Neuhoff, 2008). 
Different elements require being defined, in order to implement a BA as a complement to the EU 
ETS: form of the BA (tax-based or allowances-based), coverage of the BA (imports or imports and 
exports; direct emissions or direct and indirect emissions) and adjustment base (EU or foreign 
average specific emissions, in particular).12 In the paper, the modelling of the BA is equivalent to a tax 
on imports and a subsidy on exports, equal to the allowance price. For the other elements, we 
compare several configurations. 
 
3.3 Scenarios  
We analyse nine climate policy scenarios and compare them to a no-policy ("business-as-usual") 
scenario. The scenarios aim to compare contrasted policy options currently discussed among 
researchers and/or stakeholders. 
3.3.1. Common features across climate policy scenarios 
We present results for the mid-term of the third period of the EU ETS, i.e., 2016. All scenarios assume 
a cap at 85% of 2005 emissions, which is the average cap for the period 2013-2020, and the cap for 
the year 2016 (European Commission, 2008). 
Another point shared by the scenarios is that we assume that no other country implements a climate 
policy. Whilst perhaps unduly pessimistic, this assumption enables assessment of the consequences 
of the EU ETS in a worst case scenario.13 
One last feature common to all of the scenarios is that we do not account for the Kyoto mechanisms, 
i.e. CDM and JI, because the amount of CDM and JI projects available to EU firms after 2012 is very 
uncertain. Nor do we account for the banking of allowances unused during the second period. The 
quantities of these permits could be substantial (European Commission, 2010). Consequently the 
reader should keep in mind that by doing so, we overestimate the CO2 price and hence the impact of 
the EU ETS on industrial competitiveness (cf. Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2008b). However, our focus is on 
comparing policy options rather than on estimating absolute values, and there is no reason to think 
that these limitations will change the ranking of policy scenarios. 
 
3.3.2. Differences across climate policy scenarios 
The nine policy scenarios are as follows: 
1. Auction: 100% auctioning of allowances in every sector, without border adjustment.  
2. 100% auctioning, with border adjustment. We distinguish five variants: 
                                                                                                                                                   
10 The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES) is an energy bill in the 111th United States Congress 
(H.R.2454) that would establish a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases. The bill was approved by the House of 
Representatives on June 26, 2009 by a vote of 219-212, and is still in consideration in the Senate. 
11 A BA is also sometimes presented as a way for the EU to induce other countries to participate in an international climate 
protection agreement (Stiglitz, 2006). However some experts come to the opposite conclusion since a BA may be seen as a 
trade sanction by developing countries and threaten the goodwill in international climate negotiations (see the discussion 
in Droege et al., 2009).  
12 See Monjon and Quirion (2010) for a deeper analysis of the different elements of a BA. 
13 However, we suppose that electricity consumption and specific emissions in the rest of the world evolve exogenously. For 
that we extrapolate the recent trends. 
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i. BA full: border adjustment on both exports and imports. In every sector, the export 
adjustment is proportional to the EU average specific emissions for direct emissions and to 
the EU average specific electricity consumption for indirect emissions (i.e. emissions due to 
the production of electricity used in this sector) while the import adjustment is proportional 
to the Rest of the World (RoW) average specific emissions (direct emissions) and to the RoW 
average specific electricity consumption (indirect emissions). The next four scenarios 
represent various weaker forms of border adjustments, which are less efficient at preventing 
leakage but may be chosen nevertheless, in order to improve the likelihood of WTO 
acceptance or because they might be more easily accepted by other countries, thereby 
reducing the risk of the international negotiations on climate change being jeopardised 
(Monjon and Quirion, 2010). 
ii. BA import: same as BA full but without the export adjustment. 
iii. BA direct: same as BA full but only for direct emissions, not indirect. 
iv. BA EU average: same as BA full but the import adjustment is proportional to the EU average 
emissions. 
v. BA import direct: same as BA full but without the export adjustment and only for direct 
emissions, not indirect. 
3. Output-based scenarios: allowances are distributed for free in proportion of current production. 
We distinguish three variants: 
i. OB full: output-based allocation in all sectors. In every sector, the amount of allowances 
allocated per unit produced is calculated by applying a reduction ratio to the 2005 specific 
emissions. The reduction ratio is equal across sectors and calculated so that the emission cap 
is 85% of 2005 emissions, as in every climate policy scenario. Note that since we apply the 
same reduction ratio to several sectors that differ by their abatement cost, the sectors with 
the cheapest abatement opportunities will typically sell some allowances to the sectors with 
the most costly abatement. 
ii. OB exposed direct: auctioning in electricity, output-based allocation in exposed industries 
(cement, aluminium and steel) for direct emissions. The amount auctioned is 85% of the 
electricity sector emissions of 2005. In every other sector, the amount of allowances 
allocated per unit produced is calculated by applying a reduction ratio to the 2005 specific 
emissions. Again, the reduction ratio is equal across sectors and calculated so that the 
emission cap is 85% of 2005 emissions, as in every climate policy scenario. 
iii. OB exposed direct & indirect: auctioning in electricity, output-based allocation in exposed 
industries for direct and indirect emissions. The amount auctioned is 85% of the electricity 
sector emissions of 2005 minus indirect emissions by cement, steel and aluminium. In every 
other sector, the amount of allowances allocated per unit produced is calculated by applying 
a reduction ratio to the 2005 specific emissions. Again, the reduction ratio is equal across 
sectors and calculated so that the emission cap is 85% of 2005 emissions, as in every climate 
policy scenario. 
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4. The model 
CASE II is a static and partial equilibrium model, which represents four sectors: cement, aluminium, 
steel and electricity.14 Although general equilibrium effects have significant implications for the 
climate policy, they play a role in energy market leakage, above all but are less important for 
comparing anti-leakage policies (Fischer and Fox, 2009a).  
The sectors have in common the potential large cost impact of carbon pricing but contrasted direct 
and indirect emissions as well as exposure to international competition (Hourcade et al., 2007). 
Besides, these sectors represent around 75% of the emissions covered by the system (Kettner et al., 
2007). 
The model aims at evaluating the impact of different designs of the EU ETS for the third period on the 
production levels, the price levels and the trade flows of each industry. Then, it is possible to 
calculate the leakage-to-reduction ratio for each sector and for the whole ETS. 
 
4.1. Consumption 
The model comprises two regions: the European Union 27 (EU) and the rest of the world (RoW). In 
each region r={EU, RoW}, the representative consumer is assumed to have a two-tier utility function. 
The upper tier is a (logged) Cobb–Douglas function of the utility derived from consuming the goods 
produced by each industry, giving rise to fixed expenditures shares (αr
i) out of income (Yr): 
{ , , , } { , , , }
.ln( ) (1 ).ln( )i i ir r r r r
i C A S E i C A S E
U u Za a
= =
= + -å å    (1) 
where αr
i is the expenditure share of the region r in industry i, ur
i is the sub-utility from the 
consumption of the varieties produced in the industry i and Zr represents the consumption level of 
the numéraire good. Indexes C, A, S and E represent cement, aluminium, steel and electricity 
respectively.  
Expenditures in region r in goods produced by industry i are then i
r rY  We assume that the 
expenditure parameters stay constant between 2006 (year used to calibrate the model) and 2016 
(year used for the simulations of the business as usual and the different climate policies). GDP Yr is 
exogenous and growing.15 
In turning to the lower-tier of the utility function, we examine expenditures allocation in the 
industries C, A and S, each consisting of a domestic variety and a foreign variety.16 The sub-utility iru  
is a constant elasticity substitution (CES) aggregate of the two varieties. The representative consumer 
has different preferences over varieties depending on their places of production, allowing in 
particular for home bias. This preference parameter in region r for the domestic variety is denoted 
i
rrpref  while the preference parameter for the imported variety is denoted '
i
rrpref  where r and 









i i i ii i i i i
r rr rr rr rru pref Q pref Q
 
   

 
       (2) 
                                               
14 CASE II is an evolution of the CASE model (Demailly and Quirion, 2008b). Among the differences between the two 
versions, CASE II models an imperfect competition in the cement, aluminium and steel sectors and the aluminium sector is 
included in the EU ETS. 
15 See Appendix 1 for the assumptions on exogenous data. 
16 We assume that all domestic varieties are perfect substitutes for each other, as are all foreign varieties, but that domestic 
and foreign varieties are incomplete substitutes. 
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Where i={C,A,S}, irrQ  (resp. '
i
rrQ ) is the consumption level in region r of the good produced by 
industry i in region r (resp. r’) and σi represents the elasticity of substitution (the Armington elasticity) 
between domestic and foreign varieties in industry i. 
Maximising this sub-utility function subject to expenditures and the delivered prices from the two 
possible product origins, we obtain the demand curves: 
   
       
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1 1 1 1
' '
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   (4) 
where irrp  and '
i
rrp  are the delivered prices respectively of the domestic and of the foreign variety of 
the industry i faced by the consumers of the region r. 
For electricity, we do not account for international trade since it is negligible at the EU level. The 
electricity demand in region r is then the sum of the demand from the cement, aluminium and steel 
firms localised in region r and of a fixed expenditure share out of income E




The CES specification of the representative consumer’s utility has mostly been used in monopolistic 
competition models following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1980) where firms do not take 
into account the effect of their behaviour on other firms. Strategic interactions are therefore 
neglected, which is not very relevant for the industries analysed in this paper since they feature a 
small number of large firms. Consequently we explore the case where firms compete in quantities, as 
in a standard Cournot oligopoly. Thus, our modelling framework encompasses both the standard 
Cournot oligopoly (the substitution elasticity between the imported and the domestic variety tends 
toward infinity) and the pure competition Armington framework (if the number of firms tends 
towards infinity). 
In the cement, aluminium and steel sectors, each firm sells in both regions. In each region, there are 
nir domestic firms in competition. Firms are in competition regionally and, less intensively, 
internationally. Trade between the regions entails a constant per-unit transportation cost. Then the 
profit function of a firm localised in region r is:  
   ' ' 'i i i i i i i i ir rr r rr r r r r r r r rp mc q p mc tc q FC            (5) 
where r and r’={EU,RoW} and r’≠r, i={C,A,S}, irrp  and '
i
r rp  are the delivered prices of the good 
produced by a firm of industry i localised in region r and sold, respectively, in region r and  in region 
r’, 
i
rmc  (resp. 
i
rFC ) the marginal (resp. fixed) production cost of firms localised in region r, 
i
rrq  (resp. 
'
i
r rq ) the quantity sold in the domestic market (resp. in the foreign market) and '
i
r rtc  the (unit) 
transportation cost from region r to region r’.  
This framework allows firms to set different prices in each market. This contrasts with the Dixit-
Helpman-Krugman model in which firms perceive the same elasticity of demand in each market and 
therefore set export prices (net of transport costs) equal to their domestic prices (Head and Ries, 
2001).  
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Each firm sets its production for domestic and foreign markets to maximise its profit, under quantity 
competition with the firms of the same region and of the other region. To determine the number of 
firms in each region, we assume that free-entry sets profits equal to nil in both regions. At the 
equilibrium, all firms from the same region being symmetric, we have .i i irr r rrQ n q=  (resp. 
' '.
i i i
r r r r rQ n q= ). 
Excluding expenditures related to the climate policy, production costs (variable and fixed) are 
assumed constant but differ across regions.  
When a climate policy is carried out in the EU, EU firms incur three types of additional cost: 
- Abatement cost: The abatement cost is based on the marginal abatement cost curves (MACC) of 
the POLES model in 2020 for the EU27. In POLES, the MACC are available for the CO2 energy 
emissions from, among others, non-mineral materials, steel and electricity sectors. The MACC have 
been used to define a curve which gives for each CO2 price the decrease in specific emissions. The 
abatement cost enters the variable cost as in Fischer and Fox (2009a). 
POLES does not allow MACC for the aluminium sector; hence we use data from the Energy Modeling 
Forum EMF-21 project on multi-gas mitigation (Weyant et al., 2006). 
- Purchase of allowances: The production cost depends on the need for purchasing allowances.  
- Increase in electricity price: The marginal production cost of cement, aluminium and steel firms is 
increased by the rise in electricity price. We assume a cost pass-through of 100% in the power sector, 
whatever the scenario. The electricity price rises by the sum of the abatement cost and of the 
purchase of allowances.17 
 
4.3. Assumptions about the sectors 
4.3.1. Targeted products 
The risk of carbon leakage seems to be the highest for semi-finished products (Hourcade et al., 2007). 
Consequently, the model focuses on this stage of the production chain. 
For the steel sector, we represent semi-finished products (e.g. slabs), because they feature higher 
CO2/turnover and CO2/value added ratios than finished products; hence carbon leakage is more likely 
to happen at this stage of the production process. We aggregate long and flat products and both 
production routes (basic oxygen furnace and electric arc furnace). 
The aluminium sector only covers primary aluminium, international trade occurring mainly at this 
stage of transformation. We do not consider secondary aluminium, i.e. recycled aluminium, which is 
around ten times less energy and GHG-intensive and whose production is mainly influenced by scrap 
availability. Aluminium has been treated in a specific way in the model because Iceland and Norway 
have implemented an ETS which is linked to the EU ETS since 2008 and these two countries account 
for almost half the aluminium exports to the EU 27 (Reinaud, 2008b).18 Consequently the model 
includes Iceland’s and Norway’s aluminium sector in the EU ETS. 
In the model, all sectors consume electricity. We do not take into account the fact that some 
industrials produce their own electricity or the role of long-term power supply contracts (Reinaud, 
                                               
17 Chernyavs'ka and Gullì (2002) show that the increase in electricity price can be either lower or higher than the marginal 
CO2 cost. Lise et al. (2010) examine the impact of the EU ETS on the electricity prices in EU and find pass-through rates 
between 70 and 90% depending on the CO2 price, the market structure and the demand elasticity assumed. 
18 According to the UN COMTRADE database, in 2006, cement and steel exports from Iceland and Norway to the EU 27 
represent respectively around 0.4% and 1% of EU imports, while cement and steel exports from EU 27 to Iceland and 
Norway account around 6% and 3% of EU exports respectively. 
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2008b). Moreover, we do not consider electricity savings due to the rise in power price but we 
extrapolate the recent trends in the electricity consumption per ton of product. 
In the cement sector, we consider that in the EU, cement may be imported as a finished product, or 
in the form of clinker which must be milled and blended into cement at the point of arrival. We 
assume out clinker exports from the EU to the RoW since they are already negligible absent climate 
policy. For the EU, we take into account the substitution between clinker (the CO2-intensive 
intermediate product) and CO2-free substitutes (e.g. fly ashes or blast furnace slag) as well as the 
substitution between domestic and imported clinker. The proportion of clinker used to produce 
cement in the EU, CKSh , and the market share of imported clinker in the EU, ,
CK
EU RoWSh , are modelled 
through nested logit functions19: 
 
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EUTC represent, respectively, the total cost of using clinker and of using CO2-free 
substitutes (flying ashes, blast furnace slag…) in EU cement production, ,
CK
EU EUTC and ,
CK
EU RoWTC  
represent, respectively, the cost of using domestic and imported clinker to produce cement in the EU 
and 1  and 2  are positive parameters representing the responsiveness of CKSh  and ,
CK
EU RoWSh to 
the changes in the relative costs. 
The logit functional form conserves the mass, which is a great advantage over a CES function since 
we want to represent physical quantities of cement. In the logit function representing the choice 
between clinker (either imported or domestic) and substitutes, the parameters are calibrated to 
represent the share of substitutes in cement in 2006 (23%) and an ad hoc assumption that a doubling 
of the clinker cost, other things equal, would entail a doubling of the share of substitutes in cement. 
In the logit function representing the choice between domestic or imported clinker, the parameters 
are calibrated to represent the share of imported clinker in 2006 (6%) and to fit the following result 
from GEO-CEMSIM, a detailed geographic model of the world cement industry featuring 
transportation costs and capacity constraints: with a CO2 price of €20, the share of imported clinker 
doubles (Demailly and Quirion, 2006). 
 
4.3.2. Model structure  
All sectors are linked through the CO2 market.
20 The CO2 price clears the market: thanks to specific 
emissions abatement and production fall, the sum of the emissions from these sectors equals the 
total amount of allowances allocated for free or auctioned.  
 
                                               
19 Such functions are used in hybrid energy-economy models such as CIMS (Murphy et al., 2007) and IMCALIM-R (Crassous 
et al., 2006). 
20 In fact, PFC emissions from the aluminium sector are covered as well but CO2 market and CO2 price are the usual terms. 
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We do not model emissions in the rest of the EU ETS or emissions outside the ETS. These emissions 
could differ across our scenarios, due to some indirect effects (e.g. substitution between electricity 
and gas in building heating) but this effect is most likely to be negligible. 
 
4.4. Calibration and simulations 
The model has been calibrated on 2006 data (prices and quantities). The values of the preference 
coefficient and the unit transport costs are determined by the calibration and are supposed to be 
constant.  
Concerning the values of the Armington elasticity, large differences exist across sectors and 
countries.21 Moreover, estimates for Europe are rare (Welsch, 2008)22. Our strategy has been to test 
the robustness of our results by using two sets of assumptions for Armington elasticity, the first one 
reflecting rather low values which can been found in the literature and the second one rather high 
values: 
- Low values: 1.5 for cement, 2 for aluminium and 2 for steel; 
- High values: 3 for cement, 3.5 for aluminium and 5 for steel. 
The larger the Armington elasticity, the more easily imported commodities may substitute for 
domestic commodities.  
                                               
21 See Graichen et al.(2008) for a recent survey on Armington elasticity at sector level and Donnelly et al. (2004) for a recent 
and complete analysis made by the U.S. international trade commission for the US.  
22 According to Welsch (2008), central values employed recently in studies of carbon taxation or emissions trading with 
respect to Europe go from 2 to 4. 
 
 















 Clinker  
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The BAU scenario is simulated for 2016 without climate policy. This scenario is based on a growing 
GDP and changing technical coefficients (specific emissions, specific electricity consumption). Other 
exogenous variables stay constant (in particular production costs). 
We then simulate different policy scenarios for the future which are then compared to a business-as-
usual scenario. The output variables are: the prices in the domestic and the foreign markets, the 
production levels for the domestic and the foreign markets, the number of firms, the CO2 price and 
the specific emissions. 
 
5. Results 
Results are reported for the year 2016, i.e. around the mid-term of the third phase of the EU ETS. 
Since results differ significantly only for carbon leakage, for the other variables we show only the 
results of Variant L, which is based on low values of Armington elasticities. Results from Variant H, 
based on high values, are available from the authors upon request. 
 
5.1. A contrasted impact on carbon leakage and on the CO2 price 
Figure 2 presents the main results aggregated over the sectors covered by the model.  
 
Figure 2 - CO2 price and public revenues 
 
 
The CO2 price is the lowest under Auction (24 €/t) and the highest under OB full (48 €/t). The 
explanation is the following. Free allowances under OB full constitute a subsidy to the production of 
CO2-intensive goods, so production levels are higher than under the Auction and BA scenarios. 
Consequently, to get the same aggregate emissions under OB full as under the other scenarios, lower 
CO2 emissions per unit produced are required, which implies a higher CO2 price (Fischer, 2001). The 
CO2 price is at an intermediate level (34-36 €/t) under OB exposed direct and OB exposed direct & 
indirect, which is intuitive since these two scenarios are a combination of auctioning and output-
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the border adjustment limits (completely or partially) the substitution of foreign production to 
domestic production, which is a way of reducing CO2 emissions in the EU. Hence a higher CO2 price is 
needed to get lower specific emissions.  
The public revenues are, of course, nil for the OB full scenario, and around € 35 billion for all the 
others. The BA scenarios, especially BA full, brings about more revenues than Auction, partly because 
there are slightly more imports than exports (expressed in embedded CO2), partly because the CO2 
price is slightly higher under the BA scenarios, as explained above. Interestingly, the two scenarios 
combining auctioning and output-based allocation provide almost as much revenue as Auction, 
although a significant part of the allowances is allocated for free (27% for OB exposed direct and 31% 
for OB exposed direct & indirect). This is because the remaining allowances are sold at a higher price.  
 
Figure 3 - Aggregate leakage-to-reduction ratio 
 
 
As is apparent from Figure 3, the leakage-to-reduction ratio, i.e., the increase in RoW emissions 
divided by the decrease in EU emissions, is very sensitive to the Armington elasticities. For instance, 
under full auctioning, this ratio reaches 11.4% under Variant H vs. only 4.5% under Variant L. 
However the results are qualitatively robust in the sense that the ranking of the scenarios, in terms 
of the leakage-to-reduction ratio they generate, is generally the same in both variants. 
As expected, the leakage-to-reduction ratio is the highest under Auction. The OB scenarios bring this 
figure down to 1-4%, the OB exposed direct scenario being the least efficient in this regard because 
electricity-intensive sectors (mainly aluminium and steel) suffer from the rise in power price. OB 
exposed direct & indirect is a little more efficient at preventing leakage than OB full because it entails 
a lower CO2 price, hence less abatement per ton produced and less increase in production cost.
23 
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Nevertheless, whatever the variant, OB full and OB exposed direct & indirect lead to very low 
aggregate leakage-to-reduction ratios (around 1-2%).  
Under all BA scenarios except BA import direct, the leakage-to-reduction ratio is negative, meaning 
that emissions in the RoW actually decrease. Consequently, even when the adjustment is set only on 
imports (BA import only), only on direct emissions (BA direct only), or when the adjustment on 
imports is set at the EU average rather than at the RoW average (BA EU average), border adjustment 
is more efficient than output-based allocation to prevent leakage. The main explanation for this is 
that these climate policies decrease the consumption of steel, aluminium and cement in the EU, and 
therefore exports from the RoW to the EU as well as production and CO2 emissions in the RoW. A 
complementary explanation is that since, in most sectors, EU installations emit less CO2 per tonne 
produced than RoW installations, they face a lower increase in production cost than their foreign 
competitors. Thus they win some market shares on European markets, which reduces imports and 
hence emissions in the RoW further. Of course, this last effect does not apply when the import 
adjustment is proportional to the EU average specific emissions rather than to the RoW average.  
For the narrowest BA, BA import direct, the sign of the leakage-to-reduction ratio depends on the 
variant: negative but almost nil for Variant L and positive for Variant H. In the last case, BA import 
direct entails a higher leakage ratio than some of the OB scenarios.  
The scenarios OB exposed direct and BA import direct are particularly interesting to compare given 
the current debates in the EU and the US: in the EU ETS, allowances will be auctioned for electricity 
generation from 2013 onwards (with a transitional period in new member states) but not for 
industries deemed exposed to carbon leakage. Moreover, in the EU and the US, the most discussed 
options for a BA focus on imports and direct emissions. The leakage-to-reduction ratio is slightly 
higher under BA import direct than under OB exposed direct: +2 points in Variant L and +1 point in 
Variant H. Hence, even if we focus on the policy scenarios which currently receive the closest 
attention, the above-mentioned conclusion of the superiority of border adjustments over output-
based allocation for tackling leakage remains. The main reason is that the implementation of a BA 
significantly decreases the consumption of carbon-intensive products in the EU, while an OB 
allocation does not.   
It is interesting to compare our results with Fischer and Fox (2009a) who conclude that a full border 
adjustment is most effective at reducing global emissions but, when border adjustment is limited for 
reasons of WTO compatibility, a domestic rebate can be more effective at limiting emissions leakage. 
Here, we see that the conclusion depends on the value of Armington elasticity and on the design of 
the rebate (inclusion or not of the indirect emissions). In the following, we will see that the 
conclusion can differ depending on the sector as well. 
Figure 4 splits up the absolute level of leakage (i.e., the variations in RoW emissions between BAU 
and climate policy – the numerator of the leakage-to-reduction ratio) into sectors. Each bar 
represents a sector and is split-up between direct and indirect emissions. The “clinker” bar reports 
the change in emissions due to the clinker imported from the RoW to the EU. Given that the 
emissions reduction in the EU is the same whichever the scenario, Figure 4 informs about which 
scenarios lead to the largest emission decrease worldwide as well.  
In the Auction scenario, between 40% (Variant L) and 60% (Variant H) of leakage comes from steel. 
Leakage from clinker is the same in both variants because the modelling of clinker imports is not 
based on Armington elasticity but on a logit share function, the parameters of which do not change 
across variants.  
In the steel sector, under Auction, leakage is three times higher in Variant H than in Variant L. The 
differences are lower for the other climate policies. Also in the steel sector, when a BA is 
implemented, the inclusion of the export part has a larger impact than the inclusion of the indirect 
emissions: for instance, in Variant H, BA import only leakage remains positive while it becomes 
negative with BA direct only. The magnitude of the difference in leakage between BA full and BA EU 
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average comes from the much lower specific emissions in the EU than in the RoW. Indeed, with a BA 
based on an import adjustment proportional to the RoW specific emissions, EU firms face a much 
lower increase in production cost than RoW firms. Under OB full and OB exposed direct & indirect, 
the emissions increase in the RoW is very limited. However, when the rise of the electricity price is 
not compensated (OB exposed direct), emissions in the RoW jump, above all in Variant H.  
In the aluminium sector, the crucial point is the inclusion of the indirect emissions, while the “export 
part” of a BA plays a minor role.  
For the clinker sector, all the “anti-leakage” options lead to limit the emissions increase in the same 
scale. In the cement sector, the differences are more important. As for the steel sector, leakage is 
three times higher in Variant H than in Variant L. However, unlike steel, cement emissions never 
decrease in Variant H, and only slightly decrease under BA full, BA direct only and BA EU average, 
which shows the importance of the “export part” of the BA to limit carbon leakage. Indeed, given the 
low consumption of electricity in the cement sector, including indirect emissions do not change the 
results significantly. Lastly, the OB scenarios are less efficient to reduce leakage. Consequently, in the 
cement sector, the most efficient options to limit carbon leakage are BA full, BA direct only and BA 
EU average. 
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Figure 4 - Emissions variation in the rest of the world 





























Clinker direct Clinker indirect Cement direct Cement indirect

























Clinker direct Clinker indirect Cement direct Cement indirect
Aluminium  direct Aluminium  indirect Steel direct Steel indirect
  20 
5.2. Sector-by-sector analysis 
In this section, we present the results relating to price, production levels, specific emissions and total 
emissions for each sector in a first figure. In a second one, we then decompose the determinants of 
the emission decrease. Appendix 2 presents the decomposition method. As already mentioned, 
changes in prices, production levels and specific emissions in climate policy scenarios relatively to 
business-as-usual scenario are very close between both variants. Consequently, we present the 
results only for Variant L.  
 
5.2.1. Electricity 
Under Auction, as shown in Figure 6, the electricity price for industrial consumers increases by 10%. 
The increase is slightly higher under the BA scenarios and significantly higher under the last two OB 
scenarios because of the higher CO2 price. The increase in electricity price is very small under OB full 
since power producers, like other sectors, receive for free a large part of the allowances they need.  
The decrease in specific emissions depends on the allowance price. They fall by around 10% under 
Auction and slightly more under the BA scenarios. Under the OB scenarios, the decrease in specific 
emissions is even higher, from 14% to 18% since the CO2 price is higher.  
 




Figure 7 splits up the decrease in electricity emissions between the European production decline and 
the fall in specific emissions. Under OB full, only 6% of the emission reductions are due to a decrease 
in production while this ratio reaches 35 to 38% under the other scenarios. In other words, except 
under OB full, a significant part of abatement comes from electricity savings. 
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Evolutions are more complex for the other sectors due to international trade. Figure 8 displays, for 
steel, the price index for EU consumers24, the EU production, specific and total emissions, and the 
leakage-to-reduction ratio (including indirect emissions). The price index rises slightly more under the 
BA scenarios than under Auction, both because of the higher CO2 price and because the BA raises the 
imported steel price. However the fall in production is lower under the BA scenarios since EU 
producers loose less (or even win some) market shares vis-à-vis the RoW.  
Compared to auctioning, output-based allocation constitutes a subsidy to production and consumers 
benefit from a higher consumption of CO2-intensive goods, at a lower price. Thus, under the OB 
scenarios, both the price and the production level are closer to BAU than under the other scenarios. 
Specific emissions evolve depending on the CO2 price: they fall by 20% when the allowance price is at 
€25/tCO2 and by 28% when the price reaches €47/tCO2. Total emissions reductions are roughly 
similar among scenarios (between -25 and -28%) but Figure 9 reveals that this stability hides in fact 
contrasted roles of the various emission reduction channels.  
The leakage-to-reduction-ratio under Auction reaches 9% (Variant L) or 30% (Variant H), figures in 
line with existing models of the steel sectors (Oikonomou et al., 2006). For BA full, the strong 
negative leakage-to-reduction ratio (-12% for Variant L) in this sector comes from the very different 
specific emissions in the EU and the RoW (1.26 vs. 1.73 t CO2/t steel). Indeed, with a BA based on an 
import adjustment proportional to specific emissions of the RoW, EU installations face a much lower 
increase in production costs than their foreign competitors. Under OB full and OB exposed direct & 
indirect, the leakage-to-reduction ratio is close to nil. However, the OB exposed direct option is less 
efficient to limit leakage in particular in Variant H, because the increasing production cost due to the 
rise in the electricity price is not compensated. 
                                               
24 The price index is the weighted average of the price of domestic production and of imports.  
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It is interesting to note that, depending on the objective – limiting the leakage-to-reduction ratio or 
limiting the decline in European production – the conclusions differ. In terms of limitations of the 
leakage-to-reduction ratio, BA full and BA direct only do better than OB full and OB exposed direct & 
indirect but the opposite conclusion prevails if the objective is to limit production loss.  
In terms of production loss avoided in the steel sector, our results differ from Fischer and Fox (2009a) 
since they find that an import tax (based on RoW specific emissions) limits the production loss more 
than a home rebate (close to our OB allocations) in the US. However they find the opposite result for 
Canada (as we do), suggesting the crucial role of the specific emissions factors used (foreign emission 
intensity relative to the EU: 137% in this paper; foreign emission intensity relative to the US: 295% 
and to Canada: 115% in Fischer and Fox (2009a)). 
 




As shown in Figure 9, the decrease in specific emissions is the main emissions reduction channel, in 
particular under OB scenarios. Under Auction and the BA scenarios, the reduction in European 
consumption is also a significant determinant of the decrease in EU emissions, but not under the OB 
scenarios, for the same reasons as in the electricity sector. International trade (imports and exports) 
also contribute to the emissions decrease under Auction, leading to leakage, but almost not under 
the OB scenarios which efficiently shelter the competitiveness of European installations. Under all BA 
scenarios, imports actually have a negative contribution to EU emission reduction since they 
decrease compared to the BAU scenario. In BA full and BA EU average, exports also contribute 
negatively to EU emission reductions since they increase slightly. In contrast, under the other two BA 
scenarios, exports positively contribute to emission reduction, leading to leakage. 
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The leakage-to-reduction ratio for aluminium can be poorly informative since the low value of the 
numerator leads to an artificially large variability. The analysis of the other variables is thus even 
more important for this sector.  
Under Auction, the leakage-to-reduction ratio of 26% corresponds to a decrease in European 
production (including Iceland and Norway) of 14%, which is more important than in the steel sector. 
The performance of the different “anti-leakage” options varies a lot depending on the inclusion (or 
not) of a compensation for the electricity price increase. As usual the most efficient options in 
limiting the production loss are OB full (3%) and OB exposed direct & indirect (2%). When indirect 
emissions are covered by the BA, the fall in European production is limited to 8-9%, while it reaches 
12% in BA direct only and BA import direct, which do not cover indirect emissions. OB exposed direct 
does not better this, with a decrease of 12% as well. In contrast, whether or not exports are included 
in the border adjustment does not impact the results a lot: compare BA full and BA imports only. This 
is due to the fact that the level of exports in the BAU scenario is already low. 
As for the steel sector, the conclusions differ depending on the objective. In terms of limitations of 
the leakage-to-reduction ratio, BA full, BA import only and BA EU average do better than OB full and 
OB exposed direct & indirect but the opposite conclusion prevails for the decrease in European 
production. 
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Figure 10. Aluminium sector: price, production, imports, specific emissions and total 
emissions (variant L) 
 
 
As shown in Figure 11, under Auction, although the decrease in specific emissions is the main driver 
of emission reductions the decrease in consumption and the increase in imports are relatively more 
important than for steel. The explanations are that abatement options in aluminium are more 
expensive and that the sector is more open to international competition. Under some BA scenarios, 
the decrease in consumption is even the main driver of emission reduction: the higher aluminium 
price index drives consumption down more than under Auction. As with the other sectors, under the 
OB scenarios, almost all emission reductions come from the decrease in specific emissions, although 
under OB exposed direct, imports and exports bring also a significant contribution. This is due to the 
fact that this scenario does not efficiently shelter the sector competitiveness since aluminium suffers 
from the increase in electricity price. Finally, the contribution of exports is negligible in every 
scenario, due to their low level in the BAU scenario already. 
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Figure 11. Aluminium sector: determinants of the decrease of the emissions (variant L) 
 
 
5.2.4. Cement and clinker 
As explained above, for cement we model two production steps: manufacturing of clinker, which 
entails direct CO2 emissions and requires electricity, and manufacture of cement from clinker 
(imported or domestic) and CO2-free substitutes, which also consumes electricity but does not entail 
direct CO2 emissions.  
Clinker has the highest CO2 intensity among the products covered by our model and thus features the 
highest increase in average cost (Figure 12): more than +50% for the Auction and BA scenarios. As a 
consequence, the decrease in European production is also the sharpest: more than 40% for Auction 
and the BA scenarios. On the other hand, OB options limit the increase of the production cost to 10-
15%, so that the decrease in European production is also limited, amounting to between 10-15%.  
Under Auction, clinker imports (+36%) are used to compensate the fall in European production. The 
BA options limit this substitution effect, hence the increase in imports to 7-9%. The OB options also 
limit the increase in imports between 7 and 12 % by containing the production cost increase.  
The decrease in specific emissions is very limited (3-5%) because 60% of clinker emissions are process 
emissions that cannot be cut and only limited opportunities exist to reduce the remaining 40%, which 
are due to fuel combustion. The other important means of cutting emissions in the cement sector is 
related to the use of CO2-free substitutes. It will be discussed in the following. 
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Figure 12 - Clinker: production cost, production, imports and specific emissions (variant L) 
 
 
The cement price increases less than the clinker production cost but more than aluminium, steel and 
electricity, due to its higher CO2 intensity. As usual, the rise is the highest for the BA scenarios (+32-
33%) and the lowest for the OB scenarios (7-10%). However, the price increase under the OB 
scenarios is much higher than for the other sectors, and the same stands for the production decrease 
(7-9%) and the leakage ratio (5%). The explanation is the following. In the cement sector, the 
possibilities of a decrease in specific emissions are limited: on the one hand, the marginal abatement 
cost curve is very steep because 60% of emissions are process-related and cannot be abated; on the 
other hand, OB options limit the use of CO2-free substitutes. Indeed OB allocation depends on the 
clinker quantity, which limits greatly the incitation to use CO2-free substitutes. Consequently, under 
OB scenarios, cement emissions are reduced by 16-21%, less than in steel and electricity. Hence, 
cement firms must buy allowances from the other sectors: the share of the cement sector in 
emissions passes from 8% under Auction and the BA scenarios to 11-12% in OB scenarios.25 Cement 
firms then pass on to consumers the cost of the allowance that they buy from the other sectors, 
which reduces cement consumption and production. 
Due to the low electricity consumption in the cement sector, whether or not indirect emissions are 
included does not change the results significantly. However exports play an important role. 
Consequently, the most efficient options to reduce the leakage-to-reduction ratio are BA full, BA 
direct only and BA EU average, while all the OB scenarios limit the production loss the most. Here, 
our results converge with Fischer and Fox (2009a) since they also find that the OB option (“home 
rebate”) mitigates the production loss by around 60% in the non-metallic minerals sector in the US 
(around 80% in Canada). Yet our results diverge for the BA scenarios since these authors find that the 
import tax (based on foreign specific emissions) mitigates the production loss by around 50% in the 
                                               
25 Whatever the policy scenario, total emissions in the covered sectors are limited to 1377 MteCO2 in 2016. Depending on 
the anti-leakage option implemented, the emissions of a sector can vary a lot. This is the case in the cement sector. In the 
electricity sector, the emissions vary in the opposite sense: around 77% under Auction and BA scenarios and around 72-74% 
under OB scenarios.  
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US and around 25% in Canada. Our results suggest that a BA decreases the production of cement in 
Europe even more than when auctioning is implemented alone. The difference may be due to the 
fact that the US imports more cement than the EU: in 2005, the US imported 27% of its cement 
consumption vs. only 6% for the EU (Cembureau, 2006). As a consequence, for a given CO2 price and 
Armington elasticity and without a BA, the rise in imports would be higher in the US than in the EU. 
Hence a higher share of the fall in production would be due to a rise in imports; thus a BA would 
mitigate production losses more efficiently. 
 




As shown in Figure 10, under Auction and the BA scenarios, the main drivers of abatement are the 
decrease in cement consumption and the increased use of CO2-free substitutes to replace clinker. As 
explained above, clinker specific emissions cannot decrease a lot. Cement imports and exports are 
not a main driver either, but under Auction, clinker imports play a more important role. 
Consequently, more leakage comes from clinker trade than from cement trade, which is consistent 
with the fact that clinker is less costly to transport and more CO2-intensive than cement.  
In the OB scenarios, clinker specific emissions fall a little more due to the higher CO2 price, but this 
cannot compensate for the lower abatement from the two main drivers presented above: reduced 
cement consumption and CO2-free substitutes. This constitutes an important drawback for using an 
OB allocation in the cement sector, because these are the least costly options to abate GHG 
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Does leakage have to be addressed, and if so, how? The answers to these questions are not 
straightforward. Our simulations indicate that even without any "anti-leakage" policy, the leakage-to-
reduction ratio in the case of full auctioning in the EU ETS is between 5 and 11%. In light of this 
result, leakage can thus be seen as a minor problem. However, this aggregated figure hides very 
different leakage-to-reduction ratios at the sector level and fall of European production amounts to -
25% in the cement sector and to -14% in the aluminium sector. Moreover, in our model as in others, 
the leakage ratio depends crucially on the Armington elasticities, the estimates of which vary a lot 
across available studies. Differences in the emission intensities between the regions also play a 
crucial role when BA is considered. Hence we cannot rule out that the "real" figure will be higher, in 
which case anti-leakage policies would be more useful. 
A first conclusion is that the “best” anti-leakage option depends on the policy objective – mitigating 
carbon leakage or industrial production – and on the sector. Moreover, the design is crucial. For 
instance, in aluminium, an OB allocation targeting only direct emissions performs poorly with regard 
to limiting the carbon leakage in the sector or avoiding production loss. Nevertheless, some general 
conclusions can be drawn.  
All the "anti-leakage" policies analysed are successful at reducing significantly the leakage-to-
reduction ratio, which falls below 4%. Among the two families of "anti-leakage" policies simulated, 
border-adjustments and output-based allocation, the former is more efficient in this respect. 
Moreover, most border adjustment policies entail a negative leakage-to-reduction ratio, meaning 
that emissions in the rest of the world decrease following the EU climate policy. This spillover is 
mainly due to the reduction in EU demand for CO2-intensive goods, which entails a decrease in 
exports of these goods from the rest of the world to the EU, hence of the production of these goods 
in the rest of the world. Because of this mechanism, even if the border adjustment only covers 
imports, not exports, or if it only covers direct emissions, not indirect emissions, the leakage ratio is 
almost nil. This result gives room for manoeuvre to design a border adjustment without threatening 
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the goodwill in the international negotiations on climate change. For example, a border adjustment 
covering only imports may be easier to negotiate because it generates public revenues, which may 
be redistributed to exporting countries. The latter would then probably be less likely to interpret the 
border adjustment as a protectionist policy. 
Although the output-based allocation variants lead to a generally higher leakage-to-reduction ratio 
than border adjustments, leakage remains very limited. The most efficient variant in this respect is 
the one with auctioning in the power sector and output-based allocation in the cement, steel and 
aluminium sectors, covering both direct and indirect emissions. The aggregate leakage-to-reduction 
ratio falls to around 1-2% (5-9% in cement, 0.5-1.7% in steel and 6-13% in aluminium). In this 
scenario, the CO2 price is much higher than under auctioning because the incentive to decrease 
consumption of cement, steel and aluminium is much lower, and so it goes for the incentive to 
reduce the clinker ratio in cement since allocation is proportional to current clinker production. As a 
consequence of this higher CO2 price, the public revenues almost equal that of the scenario with full 
auctioning, in spite of the fact that a part of the allowances are allocated for free. Moreover, 
European consumers suffer from a higher increase in electricity price due to the higher CO2 price but 
benefit from a lower increase in the price of cement, aluminium and steel. Hence, if one considers 
that leakage is a serious problem and that border adjustments should not be applied for some reason 
related to the international climate negotiations or to trade relations, a policy combining auctioning 
in the power sector and output-based allocation in the cement, steel and aluminium sectors, 
covering both direct and indirect emissions, is attractive. Nevertheless, in the long term, stabilising 
the climate system will require more stringent emission targets than those analysed in the present 
paper. This implies not only reducing specific emissions but also the consumption of CO2-intensive 
products, which is prevented by output-based allocation. Thus the latter should be seen as a 
transitory solution, to be replaced later by auctioning.  
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Appendix 1. Data sources 
GDP previsions 
Data from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank, 2008. 
 
Clinker and cement 
Quantity 
2006 world and EU productions and international trade: Data given by WBCSD Cement Sustainability 
Initiative and Cembureau. 
Price 
- 2006 price index for imports and exports: EUROSTAT- ComExt. 
Emissions 
- 2006 specific emissions: Data given by WBCSD Cement Sustainability Initiative and Cembureau. 
- Past evolution - period 1990-2005: Data given by WBCSD Cement Sustainability Initiative and 
Cembureau. 
Electricity consumption 
- 2006 specific electricity consumption: Data given by WBCSD Cement Sustainability Initiative and 
Cembureau. 




-  2006 world production: Société de l'Industrie Minérale et BRGM (2007). 
- 2006 international trade: UN COMTRADE. 
- 2006 EU, Iceland and Norway production: European Aluminium Association (2010). 
Price 
- 2006 price index for imports and exports: EUROSTAT- ComExt. 
Emissions 
- 2006 European and global specific emissions: Reinaud (2008b). 
Electricity consumption 
- 2006 specific electricity consumption: Reinaud (2008b). 
- Past evolution – period 1990-2005: Baron et al. (2007). 




- 2006 global and EU productions and international trade: Eurofer and Worldsteel. 
- Past productions: Crude steel statistics from Worldsteel (http://www.worldsteel.org/index.php). 
Price 
- 2006 price index for imports and exports: EUROSTAT- ComExt 
Emissions 
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- 2006 European and global specific emissions: Vieillefosse (2007). 
- Past emissions - period 1990-2005: UNFCCC inventories (1A2a and 2C1). 
Electricity consumption 
- 2006 specific electricity consumption: Database Enerdata®. 
- Past evolution – period: Period (2000-2005): Database Enerdata®. 




- Total net electricity generation by country – period 1990-2006: U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (2006). 
Price for industrial consumers 
- 2006 EU price: http://www.industrie.gouv.fr/energie/statisti/pdf/hanprix2.pdf and 
http://www.industrie.gouv.fr/energie/statisti/pdf/hanprix2.pdf. 
- 2006 global price assumption: global price= 0.6*European industrial price. 
Emissions 
- 2006 European CO2 emissions from electricity and heat from the Community Independent Transaction 
Log (CITL). 
- 2006 global CO2 emissions from electricity and heat from http://cait.wri.org/.  
- Past evolution - period 1992-2005: CO2 emissions per kWh from http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/.  
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Appendix 2. Decomposition of (direct) emissions reduction 
We use the following notations: E: emissions; Q: production; SE: specific emissions; C: consumption; 
X: exports; M: imports; Cc: cement consumption; Qc: cement production; Mc: cement imports; Xc: 
cement exports; Qck: clinker production; Mck: clinker imports; Rck: clinker ratio, i.e. share of clinker 
in cement production. 
Electricity sector: 
       
        
                 
      
          
 
Δ indicates the difference between the value in a climate scenario and the value in the BAU scenario. 
Many decomposition methods exist; for a survey, cf. e.g. Liu and Ang (2007). In our case, the LMDI 
approach, which is often considered as the preferred method, gave unreliable results with imports 
and exports. Hence we rather use the “trapezoid method” of decomposition (Muller, 2006), which 
provides almost as good results as the LMDI approach (Ang et al., 1998). That is to say, for instance, 
for the value of Q in ΔUE*Q in the equation above, we use the arithmetic average between its value 
in the BAU scenario and its value in the climate scenario. 
Steel and aluminium: 
Here, the decomposition is more complex because of international trade. 
        
                
                  
      
            
      
        
      
       
 
Cement and clinker 
Here, the decomposition is even more complex because the EU imports both clinker and cement, and 
because the clinker ratio is endogenous in the model. All direct emissions occur at the stage of 
clinker production: 
                     (A1) 
All the clinker, be it imported or domestically produced, is used to produce cement: 
   
   
   
 
       
   
 
         
       
   
 
                      
Inserting in equation (A1): 
                            
                    
           
                 
              
                             
                  
                      
             
                
              
           
               
 
  33 
References 
Alexeeva-Talebi, V., A. Löschel and T. Mennel, 2008a. Climate Policy and the Problem of 
Competitiveness: Border Tax Adjustments or Integrated Emission Trading?. ZEW Discussion Paper 
No. 08-061, Mannheim. 
Alexeeva-Talebi, V., N. Anger and A. Löschel, 2008b. Alleviating Adverse Implications of EU Climate 
Policy on Competitiveness: The Case for Border Tax Adjustments or the Clean Development 
Mechanism?. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 08-095, Mannheim. 
Ang, B.W., Zhang, F.Q., Choi, K.H., 1998. Factorizing changes in energy and environmental indicators 
through decomposition. Energy 23, 489-495. 
van Asselt, H., and T. Brewer, 2010. Addressing competitiveness and leakage concerns in climate 
policy: An analysis of border adjustment measures in the US and the EU. Energy Policy, 38: 42-51. 
Baron R., J. Reinaud, M. Genasci and C. Philibert, 2007. Sectoral approaches to greenhouse gas 
mitigation - Exploring issues for heavy industry, Appendix 3. IEA information paper, November 2007. 
Bernard, A.L., Fischer, C., Fox, A.K., 2007. Is there a rationale for rebating environmental levies?. 
Resource and Energy Economics 29(2), 83–101.  
Bernard, A.L. and M. Vielle, 2009. Assessment of European Union transition scenarios with a special 
focus on the issue of carbon leakage. Energy Economics 31(S2): S274-S284 
Boemare, C. and P. Quirion, 2002. "Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: Lessons from 
economic literature and international experience", Ecological Economics, 43(2-3): 213-230 
Burniaux, J.-M., J. Chateau, R. Duval and S. Jamet, 2008. The Economics of climate change mitigation : 
policies and options for the future. Economics Department Working Paper 658, OECD. 
Cembureau, 2006. World statistical review, N° 19-28 / 1996-2005 
Chernyavs'ka L. and F. Gullì, 2002. Marginal CO2 cost pass-through under imperfect competition in 
power markets. Ecological Economics, 43(2-3), 213-230. 
Crassous, R., J.-C. Hourcade and O. Sassi, 2006. Endogenous structural change and climate targets 
modeling experiments with Imaclim-R, Energy Journal, Endogenous Technological Change Special 
Issue 
de Bruyn, S., D. Nelissen, M. Korteland, M. Davidson, J. Faber and G. van de Vreede, 2008. Impacts on 
Competitiveness from EU ETS: An analysis of the Dutch industry. CE Delft report, The Netherlands. 
Demailly, D. and P. Quirion, 2006. CO2 abatement, competitiveness and leakage in the European 
cement industry under the EU ETS: grandfathering vs. output-based allocation, Climate Policy, 6(1), 
August 2006, pp. 93-113. 
Demailly, D. and P. Quirion, 2008a. Leakage from Climate Policies and Border Tax Adjustment: 
Lessons from a Geographic Model of the Cement Industry? Chapter 16 in Roger Guesnerie and Henry 
Tulkens, editors, The Design of Climate Policy, papers from a Summer Institute held in Venice, CESifo 
Seminar Series,  Boston: The MIT Press, 2008. 
Demailly, D. and P. Quirion, 2008b. Concilier compétitivité industrielle et politique climatique : faut-il 
distribuer les quotas de CO2 en fonction de la production ou bien les ajuster aux frontières ?. La 
Revue Economique, vol. 59, N° 3, mai 2008, pp. 497-504. 
Dixit, A. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1977. Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity. American 
Economic Review, 67(3),  297–308. 
  34 
Donnelly, W. A., K. Johnson, M. E. Tsigas and D. L Ingersoll, 2004. Revised Armington Elasticities of 
Substitution USITC Model and the Concordance for Constructing Consistent Set for the GTAP Model. 
U.S. International Trade Commission, Office of Economics Research Note No. 20001-A. 
Droege, S. et al., 2009. Tackling Leakage in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices, Climate Strategies, July. 
Available at http://www.climatestrategies.org/our-reports/category/32/257.html 
Ellerman (2008), New Entrant and Closure Provisions: How do they Distort?. Energy Journal, 29 
(Special Issue) 
European Aluminium Association, 2010. Aluminium use in Europe – Country profiles 2005-2008. 
February 2010. http://www.eaa.net/upl/4/default/doc/Use%20by%20country%202008%20Feb%202010.pdf 
European Commission, 2008. Questions and Answers on the revised EU Emissions Trading System. 17 
December. Available at:  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/796&format=PDF&aged=0&language=E
N&guiLanguage=en 
European Commission, 2010. Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission 
reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage, Background information and analysis, Part II. 
Commission staff working document accompanying the communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the regions, COM(2010) 265 final. 
Felder, S. and T.F. Rutherford, 1993. Unilateral CO2 Reductions and Carbon Leakage: The 
Consequences of International Trade in Oil and Basic Materials. Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management, 25, 162-176.  
Fischer, C., 2001. Rebating Environmental Policy Revenues: Output-Based Allocations and Tradable 
Performance Standards. Resources for the future Discussion Paper 01-22. 
Fischer, C. and A. Fox (2009a) Comparing Policies to Combat Emissions Leakage: Border Tax 
Adjustments versus Rebates. Resources for the future Discussion paper 09-02.  
Fischer, C. and A. Fox (2009b) Combining Rebates with Carbon Taxes. Optimal Strategies for Coping 
with Emissions Leakage and Tax Interactions. Resources for the future Discussion paper 09-12.  
Gerlagh, R. and O. Kuik, 2007. Carbon Leakage with International Technology Spillovers, FEEM 
Working Paper 33.2007 
Graichen, V., K. Schumacher, F. C. Matthes, L. Mohr, V. Duscha, J. Schleich and J. Diekmann, 2008. 
Impacts of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme on the industrial competitiveness in Germany, Research 
Report 3707 41 501, UBA-FB 001177, UmweltBundesamt. 
http://www.umweltdaten.de/publikationen/fpdf-l/3625.pdf 
Head, K. and J. Ries, 2001. Increasing Returns Versus National Product Differentiation as an 
Explanation for the Pattern of US-Canada Trade. American Economic Review, 91(3), 858-876. 
Ho, M., R. D. Morgenstern and J.-S. Shih, 2008. Impact of Carbon Price Policies on U.S. Industry. 
Resources for the future Discussion paper 08-37. 
Hourcade, J.-C., D. Demailly, K. Neuhoff and M. Sato, 2007. Differentiation and dynamics of EU ETS 
competitiveness impacts. Climate Strategies report. 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank, 2008. General data: 
GDP’s previsions: data from ICP global results. Washington. 
Ismer, R. and K. Neuhoff, 2007. Border tax adjustment: a feasible way to support stringent emission 
trading. European Journal of Law and Economics, 24: 137-164. 
  35 
James, S., 2009. A Harsh Climate for Trade - How Climate Change Proposals Threaten Global 
Commerce. CATO Institute, Center for Trade Policy Studies, September 9, 2009. 
Kettner C., Köppl A., Schleicher S., Thenius G., 2007. Stringency and Distribution in the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme – The 2005 Evidence. WIFO, Vienna, February. 
Kommerskollegium, 2009. Climate measures and trade: Legal and economic aspects of border carbon 
adjustment. National Board of Trade, February. 
Kuik, O. and M. Kofkes, 2010. Border adjustment for European emissions trading: competitiveness 
and carbon leakage. Energy Policy, 38, 1741-1748. 
Krugman P., 1980. Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade. The American 
Economic Review, 70(5), 950-959. 
Larsen, J. and Bradbury,J.,2010. WRI Summary of the Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s 
Renewal Act. 
Larsen,J., Kelly, A., Bradbury, J., Litz, F., Forbes,S., Bianco, N.,2009.WRI Summary of S. 1733, the Clean 
Energy Jobs and American Power Act (Kerry-Boxer). http://pdf.wri.org/wri_summary_cejapa_2009-
10-30.pdf 
Liu, N. and B.W. Ang, 2007. Factors shaping aggregate energy intensity trend for industry: Energy 
intensity versus product mix. Energy Economics 29: 609-635 
Lise, W., J. Sijm and B. F. Hobbs, 2010. The impact of the EU ETS on price, profits and emissions in the 
power sector: simulation results with the COMPETES EU20 Model. Environmental and Resource 
Economics, DOI 10.1007/s10640-010-9362-9. 
Lund P., 2007. Impacts of carbon emission trade directive on energy-intensive industries — Indicative 
micro-economic analyses. Ecological Economics, 63 (4), 799-806. 
Manders T. and Veenendaal P., 2008. Border tax adjustments and the EU-ETS: A quantitative 
assessment. CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, No 171, October. 
Mathiesen, L. and O. Maestad, 2004. Climate Policy and the Steel Industry: Achieving Global Emission 
Reductions by an Incomplete Climate Agreement. Energy Journal 25(4) 
Matthes F. and S. Monjon, 2008. Free allowance allocation to tackle leakage, chapter 6 in Matthes 
and Neuhoff (2008). 
Matthes, F. and K. Neuhoff, 2008. The Role of Auctions for Emissions Trading. Climate Strategies 
report, Cambridge. 
Meunier, G. and J.-P. Ponssard, 2009. A proposal combining sectoral approaches in developing 
countries with cap and trade in industrialized countries.  Working paper, Ecole Polytechnique 
[available at www.enseignement.polytechnique.fr/economie/chaire-business-
economics/meunierponssardsectoralapproaches.pdf].  
Monjon, S. and P. Quirion, 2010. How to design a border adjustment for the European Union 
Emissions Trading System? Energy Policy, doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.05.005. 
Muller, A., 2006. Putting decomposition of energy use and pollution on a firm footing - clarifications 
on the residual, zero and negative values and strategies to assess the performance of decomposition 
methods. Göteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Law. Working Papers in 
Economics, nr 213. http://hdl.handle.net/2077/2702 
Murphy, R., N. Rivers and M. Jaccard, 2007. Hybrid modeling of industrial energy consumption and 
greenhouse gas emissions with an application to Canada. Energy Economics, 9(4): 826-846 
Oikonomou, V., M. Patel and E. Worrell, 2006. Climate policy: Bucket or drainer? Energy Policy 
34(18): 3656-3668. 
  36 
Peterson E.B. and J. Schleich, 2007. Economic and environmental effects of border tax adjustments. 
working paper Sustainibility and Innovation S 1/2007, Institute Systems and Innovation Reseach. 
Ponssard, J-P. and N. Walker, 2008. EU Emissions Trading and the cement sector: A spatial 
competition analysis, Climate Policy, 8, 467-493. 
Quirion, P., 2009. Historic versus output-based allocation of GHG tradable allowances: a survey, 
Climate Policy, 9, 575-592 
Reinaud, J., 2008a. Issues behind competitiveness and carbon leakage – focus on heavy industry. IEA 
Information paper, October. 
Reinaud, J., 2008b. Climate policy and carbon leakage – Impacts of the European Emissions Trading 
Schemes on aluminium. International Energy Agency, October.  
Reinaud J., 2005. Industrial competitiveness under the European Union emissions trading scheme, 
IEA Information Paper, February 2005. 
Société de l'Industrie Minérale and BRGM, 2007. World Mining and Metals Yearbook, Edition 2007, 
Paris. 
Stiglitz, J., 2006. Conference at the Centre for Global Development, 27 Sep 2006. Transcript available 
at: http://www.cgdev.org/doc/events/9.27.06/StiglitzTranscript9.27.06.pdf. 
UNEP and WTO, 2009. Trade and climate change. A report by the United Nations Environment 
Programme and the World Trade Organization.  
http://www.unep.ch/etb/pdf/UNEP%20WTO%20launch%20event%2026%20june%202009/Trade_&
_Climate_Publication_2289_09_E%20Final.pdf 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2006. World Total Net Electricity Generation, 1980-2006. 
International Energy Annual 2006. http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. 
Vieillefosse A., 2007. Des accords sectoriels dans les engagements post 2012, ministère de l’Ecologie, 
du développement durable et de l’aménagement durables, Études économiques et évaluation 
environnementale, Collection « Études et synthèses ». 
Welsch H., 2008. Armington elasticities for energy policy modelling: Evidence from four European 
countries. Energy Economics, 30, 2252-2264. 
Weyant, J. P., F. C. de la Chesnaye and G. J. Blanford (eds), 2006. Multi-Greenhouse Gas Mitigation 
and Climate Policy Special Issue. The Energy Journal. 
 
